Within a simple model of di¤erentiated oligopoly, we show that tacit collusion may be prevented by the threat of nationalising a private …rm coupled with the appropriate choice of the weight given to private pro…ts in the maximand of the nationalised company. We characterise the properties of such a threat and prove that it may allow to credibly deter tacit collusion.
Introduction
The view that the public …rm is one of the instruments to correct market failures and to improve social welfare is well established. 1 The presence of market failures like those associated to imperfect or distorted competition may clearly motivate some form of public intervention as, for instance, the creation of a mixed oligopoly. This outcome may be achieved by the policy maker either by creating a new (publicly owned 2 ) company or by nationalising a private one. The market structure emerging from such operation can then be viewed as intermediate between the extreme situations of "complete government ownership and control, and private ownership restricted by close government supervision in the form of regulation and anti-trust laws" (Merrill and Schneider, 1966 , p. 400).
While we share the above view about the ability of public …rms in correcting market failures, in this paper we focus on the capacity of nationalization in preventing the important instance of market failure represented by collusion. More precisely, we shall show that the threat of nationalization may discipline oligopolistic …rms by forcing them not to collude, not even tacitly.
Our paper aims then at …lling a gap in the by now large literature on mixed oligopolies. To the best of our knowledge, indeed, such a literature deals with the role of a public …rm in altering the equilibrium of an otherwise fully pro…t-oriented oligopoly. Under di¤erent speci…cations of the oligopolistic game, this debate has improved our understanding of how the policy maker may undertake welfare-improving strategies, for instance by nationalising or privatising …rms in an industry. 3 However, we believe that the public au-1 See, for instance, the in ‡uential textbook by Stiglitz (1987, pp. 156-7) . 2 We use the term 'owned'to identify the agent who takes the relevant decisions. 3 After the pioneering paper by Merrill and Schneider (1966) , the literature started growing in the '80s: for instance, Harris and Wiens (1980) , De Fraja and Delbono (1987 Delbono ( , 1989 ) and Thisse (1989, 1991) . See De Fraja and Delbono (1990) thority may successfully enhance social welfare without playing directly as a producer inside the market, but simply by (credibly) threatening of doing it.
Within a model of di¤erentiated oligopoly, we actually show that collusion may be deterred by the threat of nationalising a private company and the appropriate choice of the weight given to private pro…t in the nationalised …rm's objective function. We characterise the relevant features of such a threat and show that it may be able to credibly deter collusion among private …rms.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 illustrates the di¤erent scenarios emerging under competitive or collusive behaviour. The strategy of the policy maker to prevent collusion is presented in section 4, whereas the consequences of the nationalization threat on private and public incentives are examined in section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
The model
Consider a Cournot market for a di¤erentiated good, served by N = 1; 2; :::; n fully symmetric single-product …rms, all endowed with the same technology.
The demand side is borrowed from Singh and Vives (1984), whereby market demand for variety i is each …rm is a monopolist in an isolated market. Parameter s is therefore an inverse measure of the degree of product di¤erentiation. Technology is summarised by the cost function C i = cq i ; with c 0. For the sake of simplicity, and without further loss of generality, we normalise c to zero. As a result, the pro…t function of …rm i writes i = p i q i :
The demand system (1) is generated by the following preference structure of the representative consumer:
Hence, consumer surplus is
If …rms perceive an in…nite horizon ahead, and are not completely myopic, 4 the folk theorem reminds us that they may implement some degree of tacit collusion. Since the supergame is noncooperative, the policy maker would be unable to prevent collusion or to sanction it through standard antitrust instruments. However, we are about to show that there is a strategy allowing the policy maker to deter collusion. The instrument by means of which the policy maker can do so is the threat of nationalising a single pro…t-seeker and assigning it an objective function which is written as follows:
where P is the pro…t obtained the publicly owned enterprise in the postnationalisation mixed oligopoly (subscript P stands for public), and b > 0 4 This amounts to saying that, if …rms' time preferences are measured by a discount factor 2 [0; 1] ; constant over time and common to all …rms, the in…nitely repeated game generates in…nitely many equilibria characterised by some degree of collusion for any positive .
measures the weight assigned to private pro…ts by the policy maker. 5 Expression (4) is nothing but a standard social welfare function de…ned in partial equilibrium, where public and private pro…ts are weighted di¤erently whenever b 6 = 1.
Alternative scenarios
We now illustrate the ex ante and ex post scenarios emerging in the two alternative perspectives in which private …rm either play noncooperatively à la Cournot-Nash or collude. In the latter case, we will focus on full collusion, i.e., the case in which private …rms locate along the frontier of industry pro…ts. Irrespective of the behaviour of private …rms, in the ex post scenario generated by nationalisation we shall assume that the public …rm plays along its best reply function to maximise (4).
The ex ante Cournot oligopoly
The ex ante Cournot-Nash individual pro…ts of the n private …rms are
where superscript N mnemonics for Nash equilibrium.
If instead …rms collude and split evenly the monopoly pro…ts, each of them gets
5 Notice that (4) ignores the expenditure involved by the acquisition of one of the n private …rms by the policy maker and the corresponding revenue accruing to the private seller of such a …rm. This is because the two term cancel each other in the social welfare function.
where M mnemonics for monopoly. The corresponding social welfare is
3.2 The ex post mixed oligopoly
We now calculate the Nash equilibrium emerging in the industry if one private …rm has been nationalised. The …rst order condition (FOC) of the generic i-th private …rm is:
while the FOC of the public …rm is
Imposing symmetry upon the output levels of all private …rms, we can solve the system (8-9) to get the equilibrium output levels:
where subscript mnemonics for pro…t-seeking. To begin with, let's notice the following property:
This is the familiar conclusion emerging in a mixed oligopoly with product homogeneity and constant marginal cost. 7 As in our model b and s are not, in general, equal to one, we need to establish the parametric conditions under which all output levels are positive in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the mixed oligopoly. 
Proof. Output levels (10-11) are both positive i¤ b 2 0; min
and The resulting pro…ts are
for the public …rm, and
7 See De Fraja and Delbono (1987) .
for each of the n 1 private …rms. Using (10-11), one can easily compute consumer surplus CS N (n 1) and social welfare SW N (n 1) :
What if, instead, the n 1 private …rms operating in the mixed oligopoly envisage the possibility of setting up full collusion among themselves? In such a case, we have to characterise the Nash equilibrium between the cartel consisting of the entire population of n 1 pro…t-seeking …rms setting their output levels to maximise joint pro…ts
and the single public …rm setting q P to maximise (4). The relevant FOCs
for the cartel members, and still (9) for the public enterprise. Relying again on symmetry across pro…t-seekers, the equilibrium outputs are
The resulting pro…ts per cartel member would be
We disregard the non-negativity analysis of q C (n 1) for we are about to show that the policy maker …nds it optimal to set b in such a way that, ex post, private …rms will not play collusively.
The policy maker' s strategy against collusion
In this section, we show how the policy maker can deter tacit collusion among the population of private …rms. The appropriate policy consists in …ne tuning the instrument b (the weight given to private pro…ts in the maximand (4) of the public enterprise resulting from nationalization). In other words, the strategy amounts to (i) announcing the nationalization of a single …rm out of the initial n private ones, and (ii) adopting maximand (4) by the nationalised company.
Lemma 3 Let a > 0 and s
Proof. The solutions of C (n 1) = N (n 1) w.r.t. b are
Moreover, it can be easily checked that C (n 1) N (n 1) is convex in b, which implies that
Hence, in this range, from the private …rms standpoint, the game following the nationalization is no longer a prisoners'dilemma. In such a region, we may conjecture that preventing collusion requires the threat of nationalising more than one …rm.
The region
o identi…ed in Proposition 4 is the area below the curve e n represented in Figure 1 , drawn in the space (s; n). Figure 1 The curve e n in the space (s; n). 
Private and public incentives
In order to understand the consequences of the nationalization threat on their own pro…ts, private …rms compare N (n) and N (n 1) :
the above expression is positive for all b outside the interval:
with b 1 > b b for all fs; ng : This establishes:
This means that, facing the threat of nationalization, the ex ante n private …rms have a strict incentive to play noncooperatively avoiding thus the danger of …nding themselves in a mixed oligopoly where the public …rm maximises a social welfare function which yields lower private pro…ts than in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
We can summarised the results spelled in Lemma 3 and Propositions 4-5
as follows: In words, this means that, when the number of …rms is su¢ ciently small, the policy maker succeeds in inducing private …rms to stick to the CournotNash behaviour. Moreover, in a mixed oligopoly, private …rms, even if colluding, would get lower pro…ts than in the fully private Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Now we have to ascertain whether the threat of nationalization is indeed welfare-enhancing. This amounts to checking whether the ex post welfare level is higher than the ex ante welfare level generated by the Cournot-Nash equilibrium among n private …rms. However, to do that, it su¢ ces to look at aggregate output in the two scenarios:
The sign of Q N (n) Q N (n 1) is the sign of and SW N (n 1). Moreover, the policy maker may prevent collusion also in the mixed oligopoly only if n is su¢ ciently small. In that case, indeed, it will be able to choose a value of b 2 b ; b b , which forces private …rms to play nonocooperatively. That is to say, our analysis boils down to the following:
in the mixed oligopoly all n …rms are active,
The policy maker may prevent collusion among the n 1 private …rms also in the mixed oligopoly only if n < e n:
To illustrate how the threat can be enforced, it is worth noting that the maximum price that the policy maker is prepared to pay to acquire a private …rm is given by the cartel pro…t M (n). However, this would not be the net e¤ect on the policy maker's balance sheet, because the public …rm would make positive pro…ts N P (n 1) in the prospected mixed oligopoly equilibrium. At any rate, we may ignore the e¤ects of the acquisition in the social welfare function (see fn. 5).
A threat is credible insofar as it doesn't need to be implemented. Since this is the case within our setting, to credibly commit to the nationalization strategy, the policy maker need only to allocate the di¤erence between M (n) and N P (n 1) ; being aware that such amount will never be utilised. Hence, the true cost of the commitment is given by the opportunity cost of such an allocation in the balance sheet.
Our formulation of the nationalization threat …ts the requirements suggested by Schelling (1960) for a move to represent a credible commitment: visibility, irreversibility and expensiveness. In Schelling's words, indeed:
"The …rst point to observe is that a commitment, a promise or a threat can usually be characterised in a fashion equivalent to the following: to make one of these moves, a player selectively reduces -visibly and irreversiblysome of his own payo¤ in the matrix. This is what the move amounts to." (Schelling, 1960, p. 150 , italics in the original) 6 
Concluding remarks
Our paper develops a …rst approach to modelling the deterring power of nationalization in preventing collusion. We have shown how the policy maker may prevent tacit collusion in a di¤erentiated oligopoly. The threat of nationalising a private …rm, coupled with the appropriate choice of the weight given to private pro…ts in the public …rm's maximand, forces private …rms to escape from collusion.
The simplicity of our model implicitly suggests some extensions: we mention two. The …rst one amounts to considering multiple nationalization, i.e., the analysis of how many private …rms should be expropriated for the threat to be credible in deterring tacit collusion. The second more ambitious extension would entail modelling incomplete information by the policy maker about technology and/or market demand. Both extensions are left for future research.
